SIR Hack

TOTAL LOST $355K
Low Transient storage collision / Other ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1099 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

On March 30, 2025, SIR (Synthetics Implemented Right) was exploited for $355,000 due to improper use of transient storage (EIP-1153) in the uniswapV3SwapCallback() function, allowing an attacker to manipulate storage and mint synthetic assets without authorization.

The Vault contract used transient storage to store the Uniswap V3 pool address at slot 0x1, but later overwrote it with a user-controlled amount within the same transaction. This allowed the attacker to bypass authentication checks and execute unauthorized minting of synthetic assets. The vulnerability was due to not clearing transient storage after authentication, enabling the attacker to repeatedly call the function with manipulated data.

The stolen WETH was laundered via ParaSwap, Odos Router V2, and Railgun, making tracking difficult. The SIR team acknowledged the breach and is investigating recovery options.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project SIR
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Transient storage collision / Other
Classification Protocol Logic / Exchange (DEX)
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Derivatives
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website app.sir.trading/
Protocol Twitter/X @leveragesir
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Price at Hack $0.0156
Token Categories
AI & Big Data Memes BNB Chain Ecosystem AI Agents Binance Alpha Four.Meme Ecosystem Binance Ecosystem Binance Listing

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of transient storage collision / other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in SIR's contract logic - root cause: protocol logic / exchange (dex)
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Transient storage collision / Other audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $355K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to SIR, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2025).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Transient storage collision / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Security Audit History

Proof-of-Concept Exploits

1 PoC available

On-Chain Evidence & References

Sources & References

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