StableMagnet Hack

TOTAL LOST $27.0M
High #187 All-Time Drained Contracts and User Wallets / Rugpull binance bsc

Summarize with AI

ChatGPT Perplexity Claude Grok
Affected Chain binance 2 chains affected
Recovered $24.0M 88.9% returned
All-Time Rank #187 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

StableMagnet was rugpulled for over 27,000,000 $USD. The scammer used an unverified contract to transfer approved tokens.

Details of the Exploit

The exit scam started from this transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf0ba46c8…5d967c

As a result, 8M USDT, 7.2M USDC, and 7M BUSD were taken from the StableMagnet 3Pool via an unverified source code.

The unverified SwapUtil library did not only contain code to drain all pairs, it also contained code to transfer more tokens to everyone who had approved StableMagnet.

Block Data Reference

SwapUtils library containing the exploit:

https://bscscan.com/address/0xE25d0577…3eaA9a

The stolen funds were distributed between some external wallets. BUSD sent to Binance hot wallet:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x2bac0445…fb96d7#tokentxns

Tether received on ETH chain:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xDF5B180c…bDEF26#tokentxns

Tether changed to DAI:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xe5daac90…912a07#tokentxns

Incident Report

Protocol / Project StableMagnet
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) binance bsc
Attack Technique Drained Contracts and User Wallets / Rugpull
Classification Rugpull / Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token SMAG
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website stablemagnet.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @stablemagnet
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of drained contracts and user wallets / rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance, bsc smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in StableMagnet's contract logic - root cause: rugpull / other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to StableMagnet, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (June 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Drained Contracts and User Wallets / Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Funds Recovery

88.9%

Recovered

$24.0M

Net Loss

2996999

Post-Incident Timeline

  • 2022-12-01

    On 1 December 2022, after a year after the incident, 24,000,000 $USD from the stolen assets were returned.

Sources & References

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