StarMan Hack

TOTAL LOST $53K
Low Rugpull

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2022 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1703 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

The $StarMan token was rugpulled by its team. The team created an StarMan/WBNB pair to make their token tradable and dumped the $StarMan token for a profit of 173.39 $BNB.

The creator of the token deployed the contract to the BNB network, where 10B tokens were sent to him.

Then he created a  StarMan/BNB pair, 3B $StarMan and 300 $BNB:

1) https://bscscan.com/tx/0x13c8a4dc…ebc429

2) https://bscscan.com/tx/0x8eff7526…f0b933

After the community invested enough funds into the token, he removed lp, taking a profit of 173 $BNB:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xe2356bff…57e265

Stolen funds were transferred to scammer address (B): https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfb3fb8ee…f53110

Then the scammer address (B) laundered money through the Tornado.cash.

Involved addresses:

- Scammer address (A), token creator: https://bscscan.com/address/0xcbf5ac38…afaa89

- Scammer address (B): https://bscscan.com/address/0xcffe7b00…64bd44

Transactions:

- Token creation: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x808b6783…9cfb2f

- Creating lp:

1) https://bscscan.com/tx/0x8eff7526…f0b933

2) https://bscscan.com/tx/0x13c8a4dc…ebc429

- Remove lp: https://bscscan.com/tx/0xe2356bff…57e265

Smart-Contract Abilities

- Owner can open trading

- Hidden mechanism for pausing transfers openTrading() for non whitelisted users

- Hidden whitelist roles (_synced)

Incident Report

Protocol / Project StarMan
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Token

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Dexs
Affected Token StarMan
Protocol Twitter/X @StarbankFinance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in StarMan's contract logic - root cause: token
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $53K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to StarMan, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (June 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Sources & References

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