To the Moon Hack

TOTAL LOST $107K
Low Rugpull

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1507 By amount stolen
Protocol Type CEX Target category

Incident Overview

To the Moon token experienced a rugpull exit scam on Nov 08, 2023, resulting in a loss of 107,464 USD for investors.

To the Moon (TTM) is a BEP20 token trading on PancakeSwap. The scammer, who was also the initial liquidity provider, drained the liquidity from the PancakeSwap pool in four separate transactions. The total drained amount equaled 291,504 USDT, with the scammer profiting 107,464 USDT.

The scammer had initially added 184,040 USDT and 500,000,000 TTM tokens to the pool. The stolen funds were transferred to the SwapTreasury contract, which was deployed by the same deployer as the TTM token contract.

Deployer Address:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x03331Ef6…eE582b

Scammer Address:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x2a0711c2…743de0

Swap Treasury Contract:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x5c1f8486…2f2cce

Liquidity Adding Transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x50d336f2…30f972

Liquidity Removal Transactions:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3f60dd18…c979e5

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x4fd7cb4a…619270

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x78ea3f8e…039187

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2c6163f0…94a966

Funds Transfer Transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x29e0c0a3…2d2610

Incident Report

Protocol / Project To the Moon
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Token
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type CEX
Affected Token TTM
Official Website tothemoon.com
Protocol Twitter/X @2TheMoon_global
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in To the Moon's contract logic - root cause: token
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to To the Moon, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2023).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Sources & References

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