Tornado Cash Hack
Incident Overview
Tornado Cash Governance was exploited through a malicious proposal, and the attacker gained control of the governance.
Tornado Cash is a service that provides non-custodial anonymous transactions on EVM chains. The project's Governance was exploited via malicious proposal. On May 20th, 2023 Tornado Cash governance ceased to exist as an attacker granted themselves over 1.2 million fake votes through a malicious proposal.
With full control of governance, they could withdraw all locked votes and drain tokens from the contract or brick the router. The attack was sophisticatedly designed by using various tricks like combining CREATE/CREATE2 to create a contract with different bytecode and hiding intent behind emergencyStop() named function while updating proposal logic to grant themselves fake votes. Once gaining control, the attacker drained various contracts and users staking assets as $TRON tokens.
The stolen tokens were swapped for $ETH and 360 $ETH was transferred through TornadoCash, while 120.4 $ETH remains at the attacker's address along with 177,340 $USD worth $TORN tokens. Consequently, over 500,000 $TORN tokens were used by the attacker to propose the 21st proposal, which seemingly may return the protocol control back to the users. The total stolen amount reached 1,049,513 $USD, and maybe even more cause of locked $TORN tokens in the next proposal from the attacker.
Attacker's Funds Holder Address:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x09212366…77bD59
Malicious Proposal Executor Address:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x59234095…789de9
Proposal Execution Transaction:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3274b609…75486d
Selfdestruct Transaction:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd3a570af…391adb
Vote Gain Transaction:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa7d20ccd…620122
Malicious Proposal:
https://etherscan.io/address/0xC503893b…52752D
21st Proposal:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x1FAd009a…E31e23#code
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Tornado Cash, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (May 2023).
- Verify all logic paths related to Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Pessimistic Report
Sources & References
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