What happened
Virgin Elon (VELON) was an Ethereum token (0x06c11906…5d1f18, deployed on 25 May 2021) whose transfer code let anyone buy from the pool but blocked ordinary holders from selling. A modifier on every transfer and transferFrom only lets a holder move tokens if they are the owner, the _safeOwner address, on an owner-controlled whitelist, or sending to the Uniswap router address itself; a sale to the pool fails with the misleading error "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance". The owner can whitelist or blacklist any address through functions disguised as increaseAllowance and addApprove, can mint through a public _mint, and the contract has no function to transfer or renounce ownership.
De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as a honeypot exit scam on 25 May 2021 in which the owner restricted users from selling; no loss figure is recorded.
How it happened
- The constructor stores the
ownerargument as_ownerand_safeOwnerand mints the initial supply with_mint(0x553989aAAD5ab9e28f764db151a52D51632B8CB4, initialSupply*(10**18)). Because_mintrequiresmsg.sender == _owner, the deploy could only succeed with the deployer, 0x553989aA…2B8CB4, as owner. - On the owner's first outgoing transfer,
if (_owner == _safeOwner && sender == _owner){_safeOwner = recipient;_;}makes that recipient_safeOwner. If that transfer is the liquidity deposit, the pool becomes_safeOwnerand can send tokens freely, so buys go through. - Every other transfer passes only if
sender == _owner || sender == _safeOwner || recipient == _owneror_whiteAddress[sender] == true. - A holder who is not whitelisted falls through to
require((sender == _safeOwner)||(recipient == _unirouter), "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance"). A Uniswap sale moves tokens from the holder to the pool, not to the router, so it reverts with an error that looks like a balance problem. - The only exception is
if (amount < _sellAmount)._sellAmountstarts at 0 and is set only by an owner transfer to itself. Below that threshold a transfer succeeds, but a transfer to_safeOwnerthen blacklists the sender:if(recipient == _safeOwner){_blackAddress[sender] = true; _whiteAddress[sender] = false;}. - Owner-only functions with standard-looking names manage the lists:
increaseAllowance(address[])whitelists,addApprove(address[])blacklists,decreaseAllowance(address)sets_safeOwner, andmultiTransfersends tokens and whitelists the firstapprovecountreceivers. The public owner-only_mintcredits_balances[_owner]whateveraccountit names in theTransferevent.
Protocol details
Build your security review skills
Work through hands-on labs covering real exploit mechanics, review techniques, and defensive patterns.
