Wault Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $800K
Low Flash Loan Attack binance

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain binance Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #882 By amount stolen
Auditors 4 Prior security audits

Incident Overview

The attacker:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x886358f9…410c64

The transaction behind the attack:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x31262f15…e1670e

The attacker:

- flash loaned 16.8M WUSD from WSwap’s WUSD-USDT pool and redeemed it for 15M USDT and 106M WEX

- flash loaned 40M USDT from PCS’s WBNB-USDT pool

- swapped a part of the flash loaned USDT to WEX before the price is pumped

- staked the flash loaned USDT to WUSDMaster contract. The 10% of staked USDT was used to buy WEX and the attacker gained the WUSD with a 1:1 rate

- since there was a limit on the staking amount, the attacker performed the previous step repeatedly to increase the WEX price with almost no cost

- gained profit in USDT by swapping WEX from steps 1 and 3 back to USDT

- returned the flash loaned WUSD and USDT

- swapped the remaining WUSD and the USDT profit to ETH.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Wault Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) binance
Attack Technique Flash Loan Attack
Classification Yield Aggregator

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Yield
Affected Token WUSD, WEX
Official Website wault.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @Wault_Finance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
DeFi DAO Ethereum Ecosystem Governance

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Wault Finance's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review
Audited by Hacken, Certik, DeFi Safety, RD Auditors — still lost $800K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Wault Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (August 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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