WUSD.fi Hack

TOTAL LOST $207K
Low Flash Loan Attack

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2026 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1283 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exploit/Flash Loan Attack Target category

Incident Overview

On May 25, 2026, the WUSD.fi / GLOVE incentive program on Ethereum was exploited for approximately $207,000. The stolen liquidity was subsequently swapped for roughly 98 ETH and laundered via the Railgun privacy protocol.

The vulnerability was a classic sybil abuse flaw within the protocol's reward distribution logic. The WUSD._englove function allowed any address that wrapped at least 100 WUSD,  while holding fewer than 2 GLOVE, to mint up to 2 GLOVE tokens. Because the protocol lacked sybil resistance, the attacker used EIP-7702 helper contracts and Morpho flash loans to automate the creation of numerous fresh addresses.

This allowed them to repeatedly execute wrap/unwrap cycles to harvest GLOVE tokens at scale. The attacker then dumped the farmed GLOVE into Uniswap V3 liquidity pools, draining the underlying USDC and USDT reserves before swapping the proceeds for ETH.

Exploiter EOA: 0x88329A09…5a57f8

Exploit Transaction: 0x2051c1f8…b37712

Incident Report

Protocol / Project WUSD.fi
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Flash Loan Attack
Classification Other

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exploit/Flash Loan Attack
Official Website usd.ai/
Protocol Twitter/X @USDai_Official
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
AI & Big Data Ethereum Ecosystem Solana Ecosystem Arbitrum Ecosystem Base Ecosystem Binance Alpha Airdrops Binance Ecosystem Binance Listing

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in WUSD.fi's contract logic - root cause: other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to WUSD.fi, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (May 2026).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Proof-of-Concept Exploits

1 PoC available

On-Chain Evidence & References

Sources & References

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