Zabu Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $3.2M
Medium Flashloan Exploit / Other avalanche

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain avalanche Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #539 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Yield Aggregator Target category

Incident Overview

The attacker:

https://cchain.explorer.avax.network/address/0x9ed2D048…3Abf86/transactions

The transaction behind the attack:

https://cchain.explorer.avax.network/tx/0x8b3042e5…eb75ac/token-transfers

The hack was due to the lack of deflationary token support in the MasterChef contract. By repeated deposits and withdrawals with the MasterChef, the attacker frequently triggers the tax collection, which led to the exploit.

The attacker deployed the contract with the malicious logic at:

https://cchain.explorer.avax.network/tx/0x771c4454…65c319/internal-transactions

Further, he interacted with that contract to successfully pulled out 4.5 billion ZABU tokens in Zabu Farm Contract.

The list of stolen assets:

- WETH: 402.9

- WAVAX: 23,157

- PNG: 21,501

- AVE: 106,848

- USDT: 361,267

- JOE: 23,958.93

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Zabu Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) avalanche
Attack Technique Flashloan Exploit / Other
Classification Protocol Logic / Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Yield Aggregator
Affected Token ZABU
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website zabu.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @zabufinance

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flashloan exploit / other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with avalanche smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Zabu Finance's contract logic - root cause: protocol logic / yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Flashloan Exploit / Other audit checklist and test coverage

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Zabu Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (September 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flashloan Exploit / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Proof-of-Concept Exploits

1 PoC available

Sources & References

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