zkSync Copycat Hack
Incident Overview
Fake zkSync token rugpulled, removing liquidity worth 201,549 $USD; total funds lost equate to 822.65 $BNB.
zkSync (TBD) is a copycat BEP20 token trading on PancakeSwap, not to be confused with the original zkSync project or tokens sharing the same token symbol. On July 28, 2023, the deployer executed a rugpull by removing liquidity from the LP pool in two separate transactions. The stolen funds were subsequently transferred to another EOA address and distributed between multiple addresses.
The total loss in this exit scam is 201,549 $USD, equivalent to 822.65 $BNB.
Deployer Address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x1cd9af6a…ef9a8b
Scammer Address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0xa52f62dc…907594
Liquidity Removal Transactions:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x65a6f4f5…b23552
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf748b082…4a9606
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to zkSync Copycat, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2023).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
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