zkSync Copycat Hack

TOTAL LOST $202K
Low Rugpull

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1293 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Fake zkSync token rugpulled, removing liquidity worth 201,549 $USD; total funds lost equate to 822.65 $BNB.

zkSync (TBD) is a copycat BEP20 token trading on PancakeSwap, not to be confused with the original zkSync project or tokens sharing the same token symbol. On July 28, 2023, the deployer executed a rugpull by removing liquidity from the LP pool in two separate transactions. The stolen funds were subsequently transferred to another EOA address and distributed between multiple addresses.

The total loss in this exit scam is 201,549 $USD, equivalent to 822.65 $BNB.

Deployer Address:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x1cd9af6a…ef9a8b

Scammer Address:

https://bscscan.com/address/0xa52f62dc…907594

Liquidity Removal Transactions:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x65a6f4f5…b23552

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf748b082…4a9606

Incident Report

Protocol / Project zkSync Copycat
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Token
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token TBD
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in zkSync Copycat's contract logic - root cause: token
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to zkSync Copycat, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2023).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Sources & References

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