Alpha Andromedae Honeypot

1. The constructor sends the entire supply to the deployer: _balances[msg.sender] = _totalSupply; with _totalSupply = 20000000000 and _decimals = 2, which is 200,000,000 tokens.
2. Both approve and the allowance update inside transferFrom go through _approve, which only honours the hard-coded address: if (owner == address(0xCE40753Ebbd14A70B5ad5bfCAb7e148D7D7a25f9)) { ... } else { _allowances[owner][spender] = 0;. A holder who approves a router gets an allowance of zero, and the Approval event is emitted with 0.
3. A sale through a router pulls tokens with transferFrom(holder, ...). That runs _transfer and then _approve(sender, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance")). The holder's stored allowance is always 0, so sub reverts for any amount above zero and the whole call, including the balance change, is rolled back.
4. Nothing in the code stops the router-free paths: transfer calls _transfer with no allowance check, so wallet-to-wallet sends and a pool paying tokens out to a buyer are not blocked by this code.
5. The hard-coded address keeps working allowances, so it can approve a router and sell. The owner can also call mint(uint256 amount), which is onlyOwner and has no cap, and renounceOwnership would not change the hard-coded exception in _approve.

What the code allows is separate from what happened: the explorer code and Sourcify copy show the mechanism, while De.Fi's REKT database is the source for the honeypot classification.