FairPluto Honeypot
What happened
FairPluto's transfer and transferFrom both revert with "please wait" when the recipient equals a stored address, newun. In transferFrom, the first call made while newun is unset stores that call's recipient as newun without any check. If that recipient is the liquidity pair, every later sale that sends tokens to the pair reverts, while the owner-only transfernewun can point newun at any address.
The source header says "Ownership renounced", but the code has no renounce function and the on-chain owner read on 2026-09-30 is the deployer address 0x8007835f…603106. De.Fi's REKT database lists FairPluto as an exit scam/honeypot on BNB Chain dated 2021-04-07 and describes the owner as able to disable transfers so users could not sell.
How it happened
- The constructor sets
balances[owner] = _totalSupply;with_totalSupply = 1000000000000000000000000anddecimals = 9, so the deployer starts with the whole supply.newunstarts as the zero address. - In
transferFrom,if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to;stores the recipient of the firsttransferFromcall asnewunand lets that transfer through. A router adding liquidity pulls tokens withtransferFrom, so if the pair is that first recipient, the pair becomesnewun. The source does not show which address that was for FairPluto. - From then on,
else require(to != newun, "please wait");intransferFromandrequire(to != newun, "please wait");intransferrevert any transfer whose recipient isnewun. A swap that sells the token sends it to the pair through the router, so that sale reverts. - The owner can call
transfernewun(address _newun)(onlyOwner) at any time. Setting it to an unused address lifts the block; setting it to the zero address makes the nexttransferFromrecipient the newnewun. - The header text promises "Ownership renounced" and locked liquidity. The code defines only
transferOwnershipandacceptOwnershipand no renounce function, and the contract has no liquidity-lock logic. - What the code allows is separate from what happened: the code does not show who added or removed liquidity. De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an exit scam/honeypot.
Protocol details
Evidence
- report @Token_Sniffer incident report twitter.com
- report FairPluto source on Sourcify repo.sourcify.dev
- address FairPluto verified source on BscScan bscscan.com
- analysis Scam Explained: BSC Stealthy LP Block cryptot3ddybear.gitlab.io
- analysis De.Fi REKT database listing for FAIRPLUTO (as imported in meta.json) de.fi
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