ApeShiba Honeypot

What happened

De.Fi's REKT database lists ApeShiba (APESHIBA) on BNB Smart Chain as an exit scam / honeypot, and its proof links include a write-up of a "stealthy LP block" scam pattern. In the verified source, transferFrom stores the recipient of its first call in a variable called newun, and from then on both transfer and transferFrom revert with "please wait" for any transfer to that address. When that first recipient is the liquidity pair, which the write-up describes as the pattern, holders can buy but their sells to the pair revert.

The owner can overwrite newun with transfernewun.

How it happened

1. newun starts as the zero address. The first transferFrom call with a non-zero from runs if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to;, so the recipient of that call becomes the blocked address. The CryptoT3ddyBear write-up describes this call as the first liquidity addition, which makes the pair the blocked address.
2. After that, every later transferFrom takes the else branch: else require(to != newun, "please wait");. A sell through a router calls transferFrom(seller, pair, amount), so if the pair is newun, to == newun and the call reverts.
3. Direct transfer calls carry the same restriction: require(to != newun, "please wait");.
4. Buying is unaffected by these lines, because tokens leave the pair as from and the check only tests the recipient. The balance update in transferFrom happens after the check, so a reverted sell leaves the holder's balance unchanged.
5. transfernewun(address _newun) is onlyOwner and sets newun to any address. Setting it to the zero address lets the next transferFrom capture a new recipient; pointing it at an unused address lifts the block.
6. clearCNDAO() is onlyOwner and sends the contract's own BNB balance to the caller. The code allows all of this; no transaction showing which calls were made on this token was opened, and De.Fi's REKT database lists it as a honeypot.

Protocol details

Classification Token

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot

Affected asset / contract APESHIBA

Evidence

• report De.Fi REKT database entry for APESHIBA (proof: Token Sniffer post, not retrievable) twitter.com
• address ApeShiba verified source on BscScan (0xfe9286afeca555ecaa0b4ce31f53b36e003d073d) bscscan.com
• analysis Scam explained: BSC stealthy LP block (CryptoT3ddyBear) cryptot3ddybear.gitlab.io
• analysis Sourcify match for ApeShiba repo.sourcify.dev