MoltenSwap Hack

TOTAL LOST $122K
Low Rugpull binance

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain binance Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1458 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

The Master Chef contract contains hidden functionality under the set() function, which was invoked multiple times by the contract deployer at:

https://explorer.bitquery.io/bsc/txs/calls?internal=false&contract=0xb9c56744…3e7070&method=d9638422

Calling set() function led to the LP tokens transfer onto the external wallet, example transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3b8ed32a…53de91 (at the bottom of the list)

The liquidity was removed by the external wallet multiple times at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x31c99d77…e84d55

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xde655409…4887cc

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x6c9d7e8b…e4de6b

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x21d2c374…e69a10

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3a0c56b9…8cb1bb

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xdcd892c2…81b640

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9033ed6a…9f1865

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x0deb3c97…d73e5e

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x53a1f15d…7da8e0

Incident Report

Protocol / Project MoltenSwap
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) binance
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Exchange (DEX)

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token MOLT
Official Website www.unidex.exchange
Protocol Twitter/X @UniDexFinance

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Privacy Ethereum Ecosystem Fantom Ecosystem Arbitrum Ecosystem Optimism Ecosystem zkSync Era Ecosystem Base Ecosystem Blast Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in MoltenSwap's contract logic - root cause: exchange (dex)
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to MoltenSwap, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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The MoltenSwap hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.

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