ChaddyFinance Hack

TOTAL LOST $13K
Low Rugpull binance

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain binance Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1925 By amount stolen
Auditors 2 Prior security audits

Incident Overview

The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xebea5570…dde537

The contract deployer removed liquidity at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x5bc37002…c1eb0d

In addition, the project was holding a fundraising event using a Proxy smart contract:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x91889f13…def1a9#internaltx

The final token recipient was EOA, which then transferred raised presale funds into the contract deployer's address:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3fee8442…9e816f

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x015617cb…2bc3a7

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9eb3ba01…2e4500

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xdd3b416c…60336b

Finally, stolen BNB tokens were bridged to the Binance Chain:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf3d7f902…ffe595

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd932e3b0…636ca7

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x4bba48ca…2402c1

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9ab59e08…777b67

Incident Report

Protocol / Project ChaddyFinance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) binance
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Yield
Affected Token Chaddy
Official Website chaddy.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @ChaddyFinance

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in ChaddyFinance's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope
Audited by Audit Report 1, Audit Report 2 — still lost $13K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to ChaddyFinance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Security Audit History

Sources & References

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