ChaddyFinance Hack
Incident Overview
The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xebea5570…dde537
The contract deployer removed liquidity at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x5bc37002…c1eb0d
In addition, the project was holding a fundraising event using a Proxy smart contract:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x91889f13…def1a9#internaltx
The final token recipient was EOA, which then transferred raised presale funds into the contract deployer's address:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3fee8442…9e816f
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x015617cb…2bc3a7
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9eb3ba01…2e4500
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xdd3b416c…60336b
Finally, stolen BNB tokens were bridged to the Binance Chain:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf3d7f902…ffe595
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd932e3b0…636ca7
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x4bba48ca…2402c1
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9ab59e08…777b67
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to ChaddyFinance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2021).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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