Array Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $516K
Low Flash Loan Attack

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2021 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #993 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Reserve Currency Target category

Incident Overview

The attacker:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x13370353…3604af

The transaction behind the attack:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa17bbc7c…bf0daa

The attacker:

- flash loaned DAI, USDC, WETH, WBTC on Aave

- invoked the buy() function of Array Finance. The attacker gained 430 ARRAY tokens minted by Array Finance using 45.91 WETH

- invoked the joinPool() function of a closed source contract (Array Collater - 0xa800cda5…5d190d) five times

- deposited 676,410.58 DAI + 679,080.46 USDC + 901.82 WETH + 20 WBTC + 20 renBTC and gained 726.38 aBPT tokens minted by Array Collater

- invoked the sell() function to burn 430 ARRAY tokens and got 77.17 aBPT tokens

- invoked the exitPool() function of the Array Collater

- burned 804.55 aBPT tokens obtained in previous steps and obtained 748,271.55 DAI + 751,225.08 USDC + 997.62 WETH + 22.63 WBTC + 22.74 renBTC

- repaid the flash loan.

The attacker exploited the vulnerability: the price mechanism of the Array Finance depends on the totalSupply of the aBPT token, which is manipulatable.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Array Finance
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Flash Loan Attack
Classification Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Reserve Currency
Official Website array.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @arrayfinance
Team Public / Doxxed
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Ethereum Ecosystem Base Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Array Finance's contract logic - root cause: other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Array Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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