Sanshu Inu Hack
What happened
The attacker's address:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x0333e323…9f4fec
The affected Memstake contract:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x35c674c2…1c7810#code
The attacker:
- created two attack contracts, the first one deposited 2,049B KEANU:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x67a54b34…0d9dc3
the second one is the attack contract:
https://etherscan.io/address/0xe30dc9b3…3ad59f
- borrowed a large number of KEANU tokens using the flash loan from UniswapV2, and then deposited the tokens into/withdraws from the Memestake using the second smart contract. Since the KEANU has the deflation mechanism, which burns 2% tokens for each transaction, the real number of tokens deposited into the Memestake is smaller than the value (user.amount) maintained by the Memestake contract. The attacker repeated this process and made the number of KEANU tokens inside the Memestake decrease to a small one (1e-07):
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x00edd680…285808
- invoked the Memestake.updatePool() to update the accMfundPerShare. This value relies on the number of KEANU tokens (which was manipulated in the second step.) Then the attacker obtained a large number of Mfund(~61M):
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa945b185…8dde41
- swapped the MFund and KEANU to WETH and deposited stolen funds into Tornado Cash mixer:
https://bloxy.info/txs/calls_from/0x0333e323…9f4fec?signature_id=994162&smart_contract_address_bin=0x722122df…5b6967
The attacker gained 156.51 ETH as profits.
Case & protocol details
Evidence & learning
Sources and on-chain records
- report Report sanshu-inu.medium.com
- report Report blocksecteam.medium.com
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