ASTIR Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

ASTIR (ASTIR) is a BEP-20 token on BNB Smart Chain at 0x0081e8d4…c49c85, deployed on 15 May 2021 with 250,000,000 tokens credited to the deployer. Its transfer bookkeeping hides a trap inside a helper named setWallets: the recipient of the token's very first transfer is stored in a private variable _xowner, and every later transfer to that address reverts with "Recipient not found." When the first transfer is the deployer adding liquidity, _xowner becomes the PancakeSwap pair, so buyers can receive ASTIR from the pair but can never send it back to sell. The block is automatic and permanent; no owner call is needed and renounceOwnership does not remove it.

De.Fi's REKT database lists ASTIR as an exit scam/honeypot and describes it as an owner-controlled transfer block.

How it happened

  1. The constructor sets the deployer as owner and credits it the full 250,000,000 ASTIR supply with setWallets(msg.sender,_tokenSupply).
  2. Every transfer and transferFrom runs _transfer, which updates the sender's balance through the three-argument setWallets(sender, recipient, ...).
  3. In that helper, if(sender != address(0) &&_xowner == address(0)){ _xowner = recipient; } records the first recipient ever seen; every later call runs require(recipient != _xowner, "Recipient not found.").
  4. Adding liquidity makes the router call transferFrom(deployer, pair, amount). If that is the token's first transfer, the pair becomes _xowner and the liquidity deposit itself succeeds.
  5. Buys send ASTIR from the pair to the buyer, which passes the check. Sells send ASTIR to the pair and revert, so bought tokens cannot be swapped back.
  6. _xowner has no setter, and only getBurnAddress, an onlyOwner view, returns it, so the trapped address is not exposed through the public interface.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract ASTIR

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