GDOGE Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

De.Fi's REKT database lists GDOGE on BNB Smart Chain as an Exit Scam/Honeypot, stating that the contract owner could disable the transfer function and so restrict users from selling. The verified source shows a mechanism that can do this: every transfer passes through a burnTokenCheck modifier. A holder on neither the owner's whitelist nor its blacklist can send tokens to the hard-coded _unirouter address or to the owner, and, once the owner has set _sellAmount above 0, to any recipient for amounts below it.

A blacklisted holder gets no amount-based pass and can send only to _unirouter or the owner. Other transfers revert with "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance" even though the holder's balance is not the cause. The source does not state what _unirouter is.

The contract was deployed on 2021-05-16 at 09:44 UTC in transaction 0xbf2130f3…dfbd01. No loss figure is listed.

How it happened

  1. The owner address _owner is set once in the constructor and the source has no function that changes it. transfer and transferFrom both call _approveCheck, which carries the burnTokenCheck modifier.
  2. The first transfer sent by the owner while _owner == _safeOwner passes and runs _safeOwner = recipient. After that, transfers pass when the sender is _owner or _safeOwner, or when the recipient is _owner.
  3. For other senders, a whitelisted sender (_whiteAddress[sender] == true) passes. A blacklisted sender must satisfy require((sender == _safeOwner)||(recipient == _unirouter), "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance"). A sender on neither list passes when amount < _sellAmount; otherwise the same require applies. _unirouter is the hard-coded address 0x05fF2B0D…608C7F. A transfer into a liquidity pool address is covered by neither exemption, so it reverts with a message that blames the balance, unless the sender is on neither list and amount < _sellAmount, or is whitelisted.
  4. _sellAmount starts at 0, so the amount < _sellAmount branch is never true until the owner sets it. The owner can set it with a transfer to itself (if (sender == _owner && sender == recipient){_sellAmount = amount;}), but only once _safeOwner is no longer the owner; while _owner == _safeOwner, a self-transfer takes the first branch and does not reach that line. Once _sellAmount is set, a holder on neither list can send amounts below it to any recipient, and if the recipient is _safeOwner the sender is flagged: _blackAddress[sender] = true; _whiteAddress[sender] = false;. A blacklisted holder can then send to _unirouter, to _owner, or as _safeOwner.
  5. The owner alone controls the lists and the exemption target: increaseAllowance whitelists, addApprove blacklists, decreaseAllowance(address safeOwner) replaces _safeOwner, and multiTransfer can whitelist receivers and set their allowance to _unirouter to the maximum.
  6. The owner can also mint: _mint is public, requires msg.sender == _owner, and adds the amount to _balances[_owner]. The code shows this power; no transaction was opened showing it used.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract GDOGE

Evidence

Same attack technique

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