Incident Overview
The address involved in the scam:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x9b74fde5…d6eb8f
The address involved in the scam deployed the unverified contract which contained withdraw() function that allows only the owner to withdraw the entire total BNB (eth.balance(this.address) wei) to the owner’s address.
The contract deployer invoked withdraw() to transfer 6,445.42 BNB onto own address at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x749215eb…cf9414
Stolen funds were distributed to a bunch of external addresses and deposited into the Tornado Cash mixer.
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to BNB42, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2022).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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The BNB42 hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.