BONK Inu Hack

TOTAL LOST $150K
Low Rugpull

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1393 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

BONK Inu fake token was rugged on the Polygon network. The scammers withdrew about $150k USD of USDC from liquidity pairs.

The BONK Inu ERC20 contract contains onlyOwner function with the minting ability. Also, the scammer didn't lock his LP tokens so he did both steps to rug users: 1) remove liquidity from pairs and 2) sell tokens to drain all left liquidity. Estimate losses are about $150k USD.

Scammer address:

https://polygonscan.com/address/0xbcefc34e…bb9e72

Minting tx:

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xd043614e…cae655

Remove liquidity:

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x72ddca4c…196202

Sell BONK:

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xb6f40cd7…c216fe

Transfer USDC to another address:

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xf64652b1…fe1b0e

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xd0e7e5fc…7e4f57

https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x5abc0855…5fd074

Incident Report

Protocol / Project BONK Inu
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Token
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token BONK
Official Website toninu.tech
Protocol Twitter/X @toninutools
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Toncoin Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in BONK Inu's contract logic - root cause: token
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to BONK Inu, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2023).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Sources & References

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