Boost Hack
Incident Overview
The project was holding a fundraising event using BoostCrowdsale smart contract:
https://etherscan.io/address/0xb7e6db68…467703#code
They have collected 35.46 ETH in total. The gathered funds were transferred to the Proxy smart contract at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xee145c44…786efc
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7e8e6bc3…75bb55
The initial liquidity, using 17.2 ETH was added through the Proxy contract at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x095fc653…aac606
The contract deployer added liquidity as well at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x49137d8b…4aad70
The contract deployer received LP tokens from the Proxy contract at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5075c55e…a36d55
The contract deployer locked liquidity at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xfab8aaca…3d4706
The contract deployer received back LP tokens:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x90fe5580…23af90
The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa1b3a005…20e2f6
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Boost, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (December 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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