Cyrus Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $512K
Low Flash Loan Attack / Spot Price Manipulation bsc
Chain bsc Primary network
Recovered - No recovery reported
Loss Rank #1220 All-time
Protocol Type DEX Target category

What happened

On 22 March 2026, Cyrus Finance reported that an attacker used a flash loan to manipulate the ETH/USDT price used by one of its BNB Chain pools. The protocol's initial notice estimated the loss at roughly $500,000; BlockSec's later analysis estimated about $512,000. This replaces a materially higher imported loss figure.

Technical Root Cause

A liquidity-removal calculation trusted the current PancakeSwap V3 spot price. Because that price was flash-loan manipulable, it could be used to make a withdrawal appear valid at an economically false valuation. Critical pricing paths need manipulation-resistant observations such as a suitably designed TWAP plus bounds and circuit breakers.

Case & protocol details

Classification Oracle Manipulation / Protocol Logic
Protocol Type DEX
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website cubdefi.com
Protocol Twitter/X @financeleo

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Price at Hack $0.00004329
Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem

Attack Timeline

The attacker flash-borrowed ETH and pushed the price in the PancakeSwap V3 ETH/USDT pool used by the affected Cyrus Treasury logic. BlockSec reported that the withdrawal calculation depended on the pool's current spot price through sqrtPriceX96. With the spot price temporarily distorted, the attacker withdrew an outsized amount of pool value, then restored the market state and repaid the flash loan within the same transaction. Cyrus stated that one of three pools was affected and that the other pools were not impacted. The core lesson is that a spot AMM quote is unsafe as a direct input to a withdrawal or redemption calculation when an attacker can move it atomically.

Audit assessment

Review priorities based on the documented failure pattern in Cyrus Finance (March 2026).

Critical checks

  • Verify every sensitive logic path is guarded by appropriate access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loan Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Audit oracle price feeds for manipulation risks - ensure time-weighted average prices (TWAPs) or multi-source aggregators are used, not spot prices

Practice this exploit pattern safely

Work through hands-on labs covering real exploit mechanics, review techniques, and defensive patterns.