DataDAO Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $782K
Low Rugpull

Summarize with AI

ChatGPT Perplexity Claude Grok
Affected Chain 2022 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #892 By amount stolen
Protocol Type RWA Lending Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

A backdoor is created in the supportsInterfaceCall() function that allowed to do calls to token contracts and transfer Part tokens of those who did approvals to the malicious  Part contract.

Details of the Exploit

By 13.09.2022, supportsInterfaceCall() is being continuously called. For now, the last function execution was done on the 10th of Aug 2022. The tokens draining started on the 31th of Jan 2022.

As a result, the following losses take place:

558348 USDC

214749  DAI

8540 MIM

Still, any approved tokens left are endangered and can be drained anytime. This again demonstrates the importance of monitoring approved contracts and checking them for vulnerabilities and backdoors.

Funds lost: 781 637

Block Data Reference

Backdoor function (supportinterfaceCall())

https://ftmscan.com/address/0x689e0205…a1ae06#code#L1007

Example transactions

https://ftmscan.com/tx/0x754b5ab0…9189d5

https://ftmscan.com/tx/0x5d1242f7…4d088b

Recipient of tokens

https://ftmscan.com/address/0xfc2fb8fd…f8ed69

Incident Report

Protocol / Project DataDAO Finance
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification NFT
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type RWA Lending
Affected Token Part
Official Website alta.finance/how-it-works
Protocol Twitter/X @DataDAOFinance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem
Protocol Links

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in DataDAO Finance's contract logic - root cause: nft
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to DataDAO Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

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