Decentralized Privacy Rug Pull

Reported loss Not disclosed
Ethereum
Rugpull

What happened

Decentralized Privacy (DPC, contract 0x8e8fe3ad…d09746) adds one function to a standard ERC-20: mint(address _to, uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner, with no cap and no supply limit. On 2020-12-22 at 19:20:09 UTC the deployer 0xBBD5730d…AE495B called mint() and created 10,000,000 DPC for 0x177641f9…dA4eA7, per Tx 1 0xada5…6eee. The same address had already sold DPC for ETH on Uniswap V2 earlier that day, between 14:38 and 14:47 UTC, for example Tx 2 0x1fcf…370f (20,000 DPC for about 0.7468 WETH, roughly $2,003 per Etherscan).

De.Fi's REKT database also lists Tx 1 0x32df…2e9e, Tx 2 0x680f…fbee and Tx 3 0x668f…eaf5 as further sales before the mint, says the minted tokens were sold afterwards, and says the calculated amounts show no significant loss to users.

How it happened

  1. DPCToken inherits Ownable and defines function mint(address _to, uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner { emit Mint(_to,_amount); _mint(_to, _amount); }. The owner can mint any amount to any address at any time.
  2. On 2020-12-22 between 14:38 and 14:47 UTC, address 0x177641f9…dA4eA7 sold DPC through Uniswap V2 Router 2 in several swaps (opened: 20,000 DPC for about 0.7468 WETH, 20,000 DPC for about 0.4478 WETH, 80,000 DPC for about 0.1554 WETH, USD figures per Etherscan).
  3. At 19:20:09 UTC the deployer, who was the owner at that time because mint is onlyOwner, minted 10,000,000 DPC to that same address (tx 0xada5dab6…d06eee).
  4. De.Fi's REKT database says the recipient sold the newly minted tokens as well, and that the calculated amounts show no significant loss for users.

Protocol details

Classification Other
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected asset / contract DPC
Protocol links Website @dxmrfinance

Build your security review skills

Work through hands-on labs covering real exploit mechanics, review techniques, and defensive patterns.