DEUS Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $3.0M
Medium Flash Loan Attack

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2022 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #547 By amount stolen
Protocol Type CDP Target category

Incident Overview

The attacker's address:

https://ftmscan.com/address/0x1ed5112b…6198dd

The transaction behind the attack:

https://ftmscan.com/tx/0xe3744950…0a3a9c

The hack is made possible due to the flash loan-assisted manipulation of the price oracle that takes the price from the pair of StableV1 AMM - USDC/DEI.

The attacker:

- flash loaned 9,739342 DEI via SPIRIT-LP_USDC_DEI

- flash loaded 24,772,798 DEI out of the sAMM-USDC/DEI pair (used as price oracle to calculate the collateral value)

- liquidated users

- repaid the borrowed 24,772,798 DEI to the sAMM-USDC/DEI pair

- burnt the liquidated LP token to get 5,218,173 USDC + 5,246,603 DEI

- swapped 5,218,173 USDC to 5,170,594 DEI

- repaid the flash loan with 3,001,552 DEI as hack profit.

The attack profit was bridged via Multichain to Ethereum:

https://ftmscan.com/tx/0x09dc3a1a…7e3210

Then funds were deposited into Tornado Cash mixer to hide traces:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x1ed5112b…6198dd

Incident Report

Protocol / Project DEUS Finance
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Flash Loan Attack
Classification Other

Protocol Information

Protocol Type CDP
Affected Token DEI
Official Website deus.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @DeusDao
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Ethereum Ecosystem Polygon Ecosystem Fantom Ecosystem BNB Chain Ecosystem Base Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in DEUS Finance's contract logic - root cause: other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to DEUS Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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