FCS Hack
Incident Overview
FCS Token was rugged by the protocol MasterChefs' owner. The scammer's profit is 2,588,000 $USD.
The MasterChef contract contains a backdoor for withdrawing reward token FCS withdrawSushiReward(address recipient, uint256 amount). This function was executed by the contract owner on Jan-04-2023. Then FCS tokens were swapped to FUT tokens and then to USDT.
Currently, all USDT tokens sit in one of the scammers' addresses.
Rug TX:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9ffb8046…252c68
Owner address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x1bb991b2…f46c21
USDT tokens were transferred to the address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0xbdb9509e…ce1bd6
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to FCS, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2023).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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