Lizard finance Honeypot

What the code allows (no transaction was opened, so the owner's actual calls are not verified):

1. The constructor sets owner = msg.sender and gives the whole supply to it: balanceOf[msg.sender] = totalSupply;.
2. Every transfer runs require(ensure(_from, _to, _value));. ensure returns true only for if(_from == owner || _to == owner || _from == tradeAddress||canSale[_from]); for every other sender it runs require(condition(_from, _value));.
3. condition starts with if(_saleNum == 0 && _minSale == 0 && _maxSale == 0) return false;. Those three variables are private, default to zero and are never assigned anywhere in the contract, so for a non-whitelisted sender the require reverts every time.
4. Only the owner can open the gate: transferownership(address addr) sets tradeAddress = addr (despite its name it does not change owner), and approveAndCall(address spender, uint256 addedValue) sets canSale[spender]=true. A pool address that is neither tradeAddress nor in canSale cannot send tokens to buyers, and a holder not in canSale cannot send tokens to a pool, because the pool is not owner either.
5. approveAndCall also executes balanceOf[spender] = addedValue*(10**uint256(decimals)); when addedValue > 0. That line overwrites the spender's balance without changing totalSupply.

De.Fi's REKT database lists LZ as an Exit Scam/Honeypot dated 2021-09-29, noting that the owner could disable the transfer function and restrict users from selling.