LV Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $334K
Low Rugpull ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1119 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Staking Pool Target category

Incident Overview

The core staking smart contracts were backdoored with the addReward() function. The following contracts accepted deposits from users in different tokens:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x80c09d3c…59a494#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0x9e1d0964…75deb7#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0x7b63771f…c39f80#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0xa2a430ce…d6f27d#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0xb7b3ab63…dd2f3e#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0x828995b4…5f7a27#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0x5a529c3a…72bc6c#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0xd76e4470…02f7f1#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0xbca5fc48…89ca06#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3dc2d24…7b903f#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0xe52dfd3d…2a3e14#code

https://etherscan.io/address/0x478e26cb…d28c02#code

In the example below, the external address refers to each smart contract by invoking addReward() function and withdrawing user's deposits:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa5b92bb9…f03325

In total, 201.5K USDC, 79.6K USDT, 8.1 LEND, 2.7K SUSHI, 816 UNI, 1K LINK, 1.3 SNX, 261 YFV, 0.02 YFI, 82.1 PYLON and 0.76 YFII were stolen and exchanged on ETH.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project LV Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Staking Pool
Affected Token LV
Official Website lsp.finance
Protocol Twitter/X @LSP_Fi
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in LV Finance's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to LV Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (September 2020).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

Learn to Prevent the Next LV Finance

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