How much was lost in the MangoFarmSOL hack?

The MangoFarmSOL hack resulted in $1.3M in losses on February 06, 2024.

What attack technique was used in the MangoFarmSOL exploit?

The MangoFarmSOL exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

MangoFarmSOL Hack

TOTAL LOST $1.3M

Medium Feb 06, 2024 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2024 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #779 By amount stolen

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

MangoFarmSOL exit scammed, stealing 1,297,344 USD worth of SOL (13,514 tokens) from users and deleting their website and Twitter account.

Details of the Exploit

MangoFarmSOL, a yield farming protocol on the Solana blockchain, encouraged users to deposit Solana tokens into the protocol to earn airdrops. On January 6, 2024, the project conducted an exit scam, withdrawing a total of 13,514 SOL tokens (worth around 1.29 million USD) deposited by users. The stolen funds primarily consisted of SOL tokens, which were then laundered through various channels, first bridging to the Ethereum network via wormhole and allbridge and then deposited into platforms such as Railgun and eXch.

The acquired USDC was bridged from the Solana network to Ethereum via the wormhole bridge. The project subsequently deleted their website and Twitter account.

Block Data Reference

Scammer Address:

https://explorer.solana.com/address/FLq2GE2x4kv5UbK6Qw2h9FtBPcLeZnNhwSeGvDDokYbH

Additional Scammer Addresses:

https://explorer.solana.com/address/8ggviFegLUzsddm9ShyMy42TiDYyH9yDDS3gSGdejND7

https://explorer.solana.com/address/8FNFfU47C2W4kEZv3kJ7r4S4LrUNoB5tJ4NGm2TwdGW6

Funds Withdraw Transaction:

https://explorer.solana.com/tx/2HFZyg21afEgKy9NgM7p4TQFzA33ppNWwsSoLyh61wxRFB2ELkpsKPECwu4PrUtRNF3TvmJZbXmQ4thjw3gFcLK9

https://explorer.solana.com/tx/nod1VcqpUm9K5sexbJFyZSfQZpY9qJwgyQGRdtqHMEmjQ1RExtqcdsdqQBQeQ3YKqFbd9Z3YUzJ6s9t3FCFoLJK

eXch, Railgun Deposit Transaction:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe2903d42…8f3d17

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe21d8496…8ac5dd

Incident Report

Protocol / Project MangoFarmSOL

Date of Incident February 06, 2024

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Yield Aggregator

Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull

Official Website ije.gitbook.io/mangofarm.fi-1/general/o…

Protocol Twitter/X @MangoFarmSOL

Team Anonymous

Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in MangoFarmSOL's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to MangoFarmSOL, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2024).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://twitter.com/CertiKAlert/status/1760671575580545481?s=20
02
Web Archive https://archive.ph/NRxov

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

MEDIUM

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Yield Aggregator
Year 2024

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