Incident Overview
The primary reason for this project's rug pulling was its proxy contract. The development team declined to destroy the contract's admin keys. They made the decision to replace the proxy contract with a new unverified contract that enabled the mint function. One trillion miniCORE tokens were minted onto the EOA wallet. They were exchanged into ETH by the contract deployer.
Mint transaction:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xeaa1d313…39ef23
Swap transaction:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xee031238…6147a8
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to MiniVault.Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Audit Report 1 Report
Sources & References
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01
Source 1 https://archive.ph/YKWZJ
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02
de.fi Analysis https://t.me/defiyield_ann/243
- 03
Learn to Prevent the Next MiniVault.Finance
The MiniVault.Finance hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.