Nemo Finance Hack
Incident Overview
The contract owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens.
The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xda2135fc…7fc09a
The contract deployer used hidden minting functionality under the addWork() function to generate new tokens onto his wallet at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xfb014977…9bacba
The minted tokens were sold by the contract deployer:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x74f351d3…690dd0
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x579aacf1…e533ea
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x230f8d19…e12178
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x95fb7e01…5df5bc
The stolen funds were transferred to the external wallet:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6989211c…862122
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Nemo Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Honeypot are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Audit Report 1 Report
Sources & References
Learn to Prevent the Next Nemo Finance
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