Paid Network Hack

TOTAL LOST $27.4M
High #184 All-Time Infinite Mint and Dump / Other ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #184 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

External wallet exploited ProxyAdmin contract to mint new tokens and sell them off.

The contract deployer transferred the ownership to an external address through the ProxyAdmin contract by calling the newOwner() function. The external wallet then invoked the mint() function to generate new tokens in his wallet. These tokens were then sold off in a series of transactions.

The transaction of ownership transfer:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x733dd279…2b33d9

The transaction of minting new tokens:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4bb10927…7555a0

The transactions of selling off the tokens:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x18738290…cd65be#tokentxns

The deposit of stolen funds to the Tornado Cash mixer:

https://bloxy.info/txs/calls_from/0x18738290…cd65be?signature_id=994162&smart_contract_address_bin=0x722122df…5b6967

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Paid Network
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Infinite Mint and Dump / Other
Classification Rugpull / Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Yield
Affected Token PAID
Official Website paidnetwork.com/
Protocol Twitter/X @paid_network
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of infinite mint and dump / other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Paid Network's contract logic - root cause: rugpull / other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Infinite Mint and Dump / Other audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $27.4M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Paid Network, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Infinite Mint and Dump / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Proof-of-Concept Exploits

1 PoC available
poc-exploits - paid network

Sources & References

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