Potatos Finance Hack
Incident Overview
The contract deployer added liquidity multiple times:
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xc6bf5b30…202fa1
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xa7ec7b90…0a9dcd
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x67a2b842…ca8ced
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x16b47032…5b58a0
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x55dcb073…150cdd
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x659368cb…5cfc1c
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x5a141808…f502bb
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x79b9b0a1…e0525c
The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer at:
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xd2926281…858117
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x49278de1…70fa80
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xbe5a1936…c3716a
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xef2c259c…df45c0
The contract deployer sold tokens multiple times, the example transactions:
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xa51c11f0…cb8967
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xc1e2a5d2…362bc0
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Potatos Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (December 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Audit Report 1 Report
Sources & References
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01
Source 1 https://potatosfinance.com/
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