Poz finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $56K
Low Rugpull binance

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain binance Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1693 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Farm Target category

Incident Overview

According to the pinned message in the project's announcement channel on Telegram, the project team was holding a pre-sale event at that moment:

https://archive.is/BTpkP, where funds receiver was this Presale smart contract:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x354f675d…6b4d92

Presale smart contract transferred raised funds to the final recipient - the contract deployer wallet. This fact can be verified by the transaction list from 21.01.2021 (start of the presale event):

https://explorer.bitquery.io/bsc/txs/transfers?currency=BNB&receiver=0x8375f77e…4c2073

The contract deployer distributed stolen funds between some external wallets at the following transactions:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x37788e98…bbb213

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x464dadcd…607044

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x29165ba9…3abc47

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xe01f160d…6a4453

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf77e1e60…917896

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x94f97112…6a14e3

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xa0ae88a0…3f4716

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x8721007c…8fb22f

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Poz finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) binance
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Farm
Affected Token POZ
Official Website poz.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @PodFinance

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Launchpad Avalanche Ecosystem Ferrum Network BNB Chain Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Poz finance's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Poz finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

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