RETAWATCH Rug Pull

What the code allows:

1. The constructor assigns the whole supply to an address chosen at deployment: _owner = tokenOwner; _rOwned[tokenOwner] = _rTotal;. That holder can sell into any pool without a limit, because the token has no transfer cap, cooldown or sell restriction.
2. Every non-exempt transfer splits off reflection, burn and charity fees: return tAmount.sub(tFee).sub(tBurn).sub(tCharity);. The sender is debited the full amount (_rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);), the recipient receives only rTransferAmount, and the charity share is credited to FeeAddress.
3. The owner can change the rates with updateFee, whose cap is require(_txFee < 100 && _burnFee < 100 && _charityFee < 100); per fee, so each fee can be set up to 99 percent. Because the three fees are checked separately, a combined total above 100 percent would make the SafeMath subtraction revert and block every non-exempt transfer. The owner can also redirect the charity fee with setAsCharityAccount. The on-chain owner read on 2026-09-30 is the zero address, so renounceOwnership() was executed at some point; the code evidence does not show when.

What De.Fi's REKT database lists as having happened:

4. The creator moved 15M RTW to a wallet that created the BNB and BUSD pools, and spread tokens across team-controlled wallets.
5. That wallet removed liquidity several times, and the creator sent a further 20M RTW to another wallet that sold them on PancakeSwap for 96.5 BNB, part of which moved on to further wallets.