How much was lost in the Token.Store hack?

The Token.Store hack resulted in $160M in losses on June 11, 2019.

What attack technique was used in the Token.Store exploit?

The Token.Store exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

Token.Store Hack

TOTAL LOST $160M

Critical #55 All-Time Jun 11, 2019 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2019 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #55 By amount stolen

Protocol Type Dexs Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

The team working on the Token.Store wallet decided to close and leave with the users' funds, taking $160 million.

Details of the Exploit

Token.Store is a decentralized cryptocurrency exchange launched in July 2017.

Token.Store meant itself as a centralized exchanger like Binance, FX, with a good development team, user data protection and conscientious owners. In practice, it turned out to be a scam project that at some point "ran away" from its users, investors, while taking a billion $CNY including $BTC, $XRP, $ETH and other currencies.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Token.Store

Date of Incident June 11, 2019

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification CeFi

Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Dexs

Official Website token.store/

Protocol Twitter/X @TokenDotStore

Team Anonymous

Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories

Solana Ecosystem Base Ecosystem

Protocol Links

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Token.Store's contract logic - root cause: cefi

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Token.Store, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (June 2019).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://www.dailyadvent.com/news/cff66882f06295d9848a396ba3c7a7f…

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

CRITICAL

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause CeFi
Year 2019

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