True Seigniorage Dollar Hack

TOTAL LOST $17K
Low Rugpull ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1905 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

From the project's Twitter publication:

"A malicious attacker has just utilized $TSD DAO to mint 11.8 billion tokens to his own account and sold all to Pancakeswap. Here is what happened:

1. Due to long Debt phase, people unbond from DAO because they no longer have rewards from expansion..

2. Dev account has only 9% of the DAO. We failed once when proposing the Implementation to enable the crosschain bridge. In this case, Dev account does not have enough stack to vote against the attacker.

3. What has been done by him? He gradually bought $TSD at low price to accumulate until he has more than 33% of the DAO. Then he proposed an Implementation and voted for it. Because he possess enough stack to finish the voting process, the Implementation went through successfully

In the Implementation, the attacker added code to mint for himself 11.8 billion $TSD. Then he sold all of the tokens to Pancakeswap. That's sad, it is an attack but it is how a decentralized DAO works.

Actually, the attacker minted 11.5 quintillion $TSD, not 11.8 billion. He sold 11.8 billion $TSD to Pancakeswap though ->"

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb50cd62c…278faa

Incident Report

Protocol / Project True Seigniorage Dollar
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Stablecoin
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token TSD
Official Website truedollar.finance/#/
Protocol Twitter/X @TrueSeigniorage

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in True Seigniorage Dollar's contract logic - root cause: stablecoin
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to True Seigniorage Dollar, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Sources & References

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