TrustPad Hack
Incident Overview
TrustPad, a DeFi launchpad on Binance Smart Chain, was exploited, resulting in the loss of 615.19 BNB worth approximately 152,487 USD.
TrustPad is a DeFi launchpad running on the Binance Smart Chain. On November 7, 2023, the project's vulnerable smart contracts were exploited by an attacker. The vulnerability was in the staking mechanism, allowing the attacker to perform multiple deposit and withdraw transactions to exploit and withdraw roughly 615.19 BNB.
The stolen funds were then deposited into TornadoCash, making it difficult to trace the attacker's identity. The exploit resulted in a loss of approximately 152,487 USD worth of BNB.
Attacker Address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x1a7b1535…cE0dC9
Malicious Transaction:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x191a34e6…c03182
Malicious Contract Address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x1694d7fA…26909a
TornadoCash Deposit Transaction:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfe5543ce…734eee
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to TrustPad, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2023).
- Verify all logic paths related to Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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