Yearnspace Hack

TOTAL LOST $34K
Low Rugpull ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1805 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

The contract deployer had permission to mint tokens as he added himself to the list of minters by invoking addMinter function:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb3b88155…e4583f

The owner called the mint function twice at the following transactions:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaa5b1712…d29eeb

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x95aac0cc…b34183

The total supply was increased by 15,000 YFS tokens. The owner obtained the YFS tokens and started exchanging them for ETH, having conducted a total of 38 transactions. The contract deployer stole 58 ETH and split this amount among some external wallets. The website is down and the Twitter account is deleted.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Yearnspace
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token YFS
Official Website yearn.space/
Protocol Twitter/X @YEARNSPACE

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Yearnspace's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Yearnspace, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (December 2020).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Sources & References

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