Zap Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $22K
Low Rugpull binance

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain binance Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1875 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

The contract deployer migrated the users' LP tokens by invoking depositReward() function at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xad5c9ab2…e6dde4

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x82189550…44a605

The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x50bfb244…3a6b99

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc00da145…ef3b48

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2c5f46d7…3354b9

Stolen funds were transferred to the external wallet at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x887fd639…594eb5

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x0fabdcb1…450ff1

The recipient deposited funds into Binance Hot Wallet at:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x1e9cac7e…cea409

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x08f6fbb2…79e7a6

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Zap Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) binance
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Exchange (DEX)
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Yield
Affected Token ZAP
Official Website zap.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @apyfinance

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Zap Finance's contract logic - root cause: exchange (dex)
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $22K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Zap Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Sources & References

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