Zap Finance Hack
Incident Overview
The contract deployer migrated the users' LP tokens by invoking depositReward() function at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xad5c9ab2…e6dde4
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x82189550…44a605
The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x50bfb244…3a6b99
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc00da145…ef3b48
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2c5f46d7…3354b9
Stolen funds were transferred to the external wallet at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x887fd639…594eb5
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x0fabdcb1…450ff1
The recipient deposited funds into Binance Hot Wallet at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x1e9cac7e…cea409
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x08f6fbb2…79e7a6
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Zap Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2021).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Audit Report 1 Report
Sources & References
Learn to Prevent the Next Zap Finance
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