How much was lost in the Fake zkSync hack?

The Fake zkSync hack resulted in $107K in losses on August 12, 2023.

What attack technique was used in the Fake zkSync exploit?

The Fake zkSync exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

Fake zkSync Hack

TOTAL LOST $107K

Low Aug 12, 2023 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #1510 By amount stolen

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

Fake zkSync BEP20 token experienced a rugpull on Aug 12, 2023, with liquidity removal; total funds lost: 106,527 $USD.

Details of the Exploit

zkSync is a fake BEP20 token trading on PancakeSwap, not to be confused with the original project. On Aug 12, 2023, the deployer removed liquidity from the LP pool, resulting in a rugpull. The stolen funds, amounting to 106,527 $USD, were subsequently transferred to another EOA.

Block Data Reference

- Deployer Address:

https://bscscan.com/address/0xB6f7Df81…6d9272

- Funds Holder as of August 17, 2023:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x50208769…1bea45

- Liquidity Removal Transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x8b9ab4f8…964d96

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Fake zkSync

Date of Incident August 12, 2023

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Token

Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull

Affected Token zkSync

Team Anonymous

Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Fake zkSync's contract logic - root cause: token

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Fake zkSync, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (August 2023).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://twitter.com/certikalert/status/1690400707701096448?s=46

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

LOW

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Token
Year 2023

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