Incident Overview
The $KLB token has been rugpulled by the token creator. The token creator deployed $KLB token and when the price of it went up the scammer exchanged tokens for $BNB dumping the price of $KLB.
Klein Bottle's smart contract had never been published by the project deployer, https://bscscan.com/address/0x60930de2…b4c544#code. This implicates that any investors intending to conduct due diligence and research on the source code would not have encountered any useful information. In simple terms, the project stood only on the grounds of promises made by the team, which could not be checked by investors since the source of code was not available to them.
The creator of the $KLB token minted 100B $KLB tokens. (https://bscscan.com/tx/0x6d022790…88d319).
After the creation of the price asset, 70% of the total supply was sent to this address (https://bscscan.com/token/0x60930de2…b4c544?a=0x486844e1…7ec91b), where the tokens are located at the time of this writing. 13.8% were distributed among various scammer addresses. Perhaps an attempt to make the token distribution appear more normal. The below transactions show where funds have been sent:
Transfer transaction to address (A): https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2d97020d…01a421
Transfer transaction to address (B): https://bscscan.com/tx/0x6c26372c…654fea
Transfer transaction to address (C): https://bscscan.com/tx/0x4f08766c…2ca448
The address (A) created a liquidity pool between $BNB and $KLB. They waited until the token price became acceptable, then they started dumping the token price.
Stolen funds are currently located at these addresses:
1) https://bscscan.com/address/0x67074b65…c962b6 - ~ $87k
2) https://bscscan.com/address/0xc42d3f5d…192300 - ~ $2k
As the time of this writing information on this case is scarce. More sources will be added if the case should develop.
Token contract address: https://bscscan.com/address/0x60930de2…b4c544
Scammer addresses:
1) https://bscscan.com/address/0x13cdf67b…9e30f8
2) https://bscscan.com/address/0x67074b65…c962b6
3) https://bscscan.com/address/0xc42d3f5d…192300
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Klein Bottle, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2022).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
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