How much was lost in the SHADE INU Token hack?

The SHADE INU Token hack resulted in $54K in losses on July 06, 2022.

What attack technique was used in the SHADE INU Token exploit?

The SHADE INU Token exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

SHADE INU Token Hack

TOTAL LOST $54K

Low Jul 06, 2022 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2022 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #1701 By amount stolen

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

The $SadeIT token has been rugpulled by the token creator. The token creator deployed $SadeIT token and when the price increased the scammer exchanged tokens for $BNB dumping the price of $SadeIT.

Details of the Exploit

The creator of the token $SadeIT deployed the smart contract and minted himself 5B tokens in this transaction: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x5f5bd205…c146d7

Immediately after the contract was created, 200 BNB was received by another address in this transaction: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x09aa93f9…62137f Received $BNB were used to create a liquidity pool on PancakeSwap:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xcba09086…eaef9e

When the price of the token became acceptable to the scammer, the two swapping transactions was made for ~983T $SadeIT, receiving 424.8 $BNB of which the profit is 224.8 $BNB:

1) https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd2811df9…edc733

2) https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd6fb62ac…32ddc7

Then all the tokens were transferred to another address in this transaction: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x1b672d0a…a939fa

From this address, 150 BNB was sent to the address of the creator of the $NodyC token, which also got rugpulled.

As the time of this writing information on this case is scarce. More sources will be added if the case should develop.

Block Data Reference

Token contract address: https://bscscan.com/address/0x24676ea2…c43d7e

Scammer addresses:

1) https://bscscan.com/address/0x698c726d…8ba003 (Token creator)

2) https://bscscan.com/address/0x91a20dcb…b4b073 (EOA that sent 200 $BNB to token creator)

3) https://bscscan.com/address/0x5f56e93b…706f6c (Creator of $NodyC)

A little warning (NFA)

Attention, do not interact with projects that are sponsored by this account (https://bscscan.com/address/0x91a20dcb…b4b073). This account creates tokens which are then rugpulled, taking a good profit for themselves. There is a possibility that this account has a telegram group or it sponsors telegram groups to purchase its tokens.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project SHADE INU Token

Date of Incident July 06, 2022

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Token

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull

Affected Token SadeIT

Official Website www.shadetoken.com/

Protocol Twitter/X @ShadeToken

Team Anonymous

Source Code Verified On-Chain

Market Context at Time of Hack

Protocol Links

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in SHADE INU Token's contract logic - root cause: token

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to SHADE INU Token, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2022).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

Free Trial

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

LOW

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Token
Year 2022

Learn to Prevent the Next SHADE INU Token

The SHADE INU Token hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.

Start Free Trial Browse Attack Library