LongNoseDog Rug Pull

What the verified code allows:

1. The token stores no balances. Every read and transfer is delegated to an external contract: return Accounting(accounting).balanceOf(who); and return Accounting(accounting).doTransfer(msg.sender, msg.sender, to, amount);.
2. The constructor only emits a mint event and assigns nothing: emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, _totalSupply);. Who holds the supply is decided entirely inside the accounting contract, whose source is not in the verified token code.
3. The owner picks that contract and can change it at any time: function setAccountingAddress(address accountingAddress) public { require(msg.sender == owner); accounting = accountingAddress; }.
4. transfer and transferFrom emit a Transfer event before the delegated call runs (emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);), so the event log does not by itself prove that a balance moved.
5. renounceOwnership() exists and sets owner = address(0). The on-chain owner() read on 2026-09-30 returned the zero address, so the accounting pointer can no longer be changed now; when that happened is not shown by the evidence.

, per the sources:

6. PeckShield Alert reported that the deployer swapped LONG for about 998.7 BNB (about 310K USD) and that LONG fell 100%.
7. De.Fi's REKT database lists the event as an exit scam/rugpull of 309,749 USD from PancakeSwap, with the funds moved through multiple EOA addresses.