SharkTron Rug Pull

Reported loss $10.0M
Rugpull

What happened

Malicious function in the staking contract allowed the contract deployer to transfer 229M TRX from it. The tokens were then spread to different EOAs and exchanges.

The contract deployer had the ability to call the rrInfo() function in the staking contract, which was designed for the malicious transfer of TRX from it. An example of this function calling resulted in a 1M TRX transfer. The code of the smart contract isn’t verified.

The deployer then bought SRX and SWD on JustSwap. There was another malicious function, getAllT(), which was used to perform a rug pull, removing 229M TRX from the staking contract. These TRXs were then sent to other EOAs.

The contract deployer:

Address TJTAYh…Btdz

Example of the function calling (1M TRX transfer):

Source

Transaction of 229M TRX removed from staking contract:

Source

Transactions of TRXs sent to other EOAs:

Source

Source

Source

Source

Protocol details

Classification Exchange (DEX)
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected asset / contract SRX
Protocol links Website @shark_tron

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