How much was lost in the SharkTron hack?

The SharkTron hack resulted in $10.0M in losses on October 28, 2020.

What attack technique was used in the SharkTron exploit?

The SharkTron exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

SharkTron Hack

TOTAL LOST $10.0M

High Oct 28, 2020 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2020 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #305 By amount stolen

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

Malicious function in the staking contract allowed the contract deployer to transfer 229M TRX from it. The tokens were then spread to different EOAs and exchanges.

Details of the Exploit

The contract deployer had the ability to call the rrInfo() function in the staking contract, which was designed for the malicious transfer of TRX from it. An example of this function calling resulted in a 1M TRX transfer. The code of the smart contract isn’t verified.

The deployer then bought SRX and SWD on JustSwap. There was another malicious function, getAllT(), which was used to perform a rug pull, removing 229M TRX from the staking contract. These TRXs were then sent to other EOAs.

Block Data Reference

The contract deployer:

https://tronscan.org/#/address/TJTAYhG2EwqWuMF6v1UFP3KqZXX32UBtdz

Example of the function calling (1M TRX transfer):

https://tronscan.org/#/transaction/f1aa69f5bb2c70572006ffc7b94f8b000c1f047d00b57224357cbd0bce80b1f7

Transaction of 229M TRX removed from staking contract:

https://tronscan.org/#/transaction/f381e7d013022504257e02d3e6b51bef247ed94b8e916999dbb33a3e07a919af

Transactions of TRXs sent to other EOAs:

https://tronscan.org/#/transaction/793669f6efa3321704c06578a6941fca6f4a098512c7ff9808802c90da5fbd4f

https://tronscan.org/#/transaction/c1bf2b328ce16f53d65908b21d128ca7e5492ec848f9f3cf8a577ea907a9e460

https://tronscan.org/#/transaction/e68088aff5aa8dd688faa4b7b4d679aed5e74fc2969036207d07da8f12cc3fb8

https://tronscan.org/#/transaction/657315fb2bd3e3581376d691b26f87691166927273cbd937243dfcdb52b3128f

Incident Report

Protocol / Project SharkTron

Date of Incident October 28, 2020

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Exchange (DEX)

Primary Source View Post-Mortem #1

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull

Affected Token SRX

Official Website sharkinvest.io/

Protocol Twitter/X @shark_tron

Team Anonymous

Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in SharkTron's contract logic - root cause: exchange (dex)

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to SharkTron, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2020).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

Free Trial

Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://news.bitcoin.com/sharktron-defi-project-devs-exit-scam-t…
02
Web Archive https://web.archive.org/web/20201101141809/https://sharkinvest.io/

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

HIGH

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Exchange (DEX)
Year 2020

Learn to Prevent the Next SharkTron

The SharkTron hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.

Start Free Trial Browse Attack Library