SharkTron Rug Pull
What happened
Malicious function in the staking contract allowed the contract deployer to transfer 229M TRX from it. The tokens were then spread to different EOAs and exchanges.
The contract deployer had the ability to call the rrInfo() function in the staking contract, which was designed for the malicious transfer of TRX from it. An example of this function calling resulted in a 1M TRX transfer. The code of the smart contract isn’t verified.
The deployer then bought SRX and SWD on JustSwap. There was another malicious function, getAllT(), which was used to perform a rug pull, removing 229M TRX from the staking contract. These TRXs were then sent to other EOAs.
Protocol details
Evidence
- report Report news.bitcoin.com
- analysis Web Archive web.archive.org
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