SuperMarioBros Hack
Incident Overview
The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xba3a2fca…653bc0
The contract deployer used hidden minting functionality under the burn() function to generate new tokens onto his wallet at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3bb99fc6…39b679
The minted tokens were sold by the contract deployer at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x16125deb…1931f7
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to SuperMarioBros, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSources & References
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Source 1 https://t.me/defiyield_ann/189
Learn to Prevent the Next SuperMarioBros
The SuperMarioBros hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.