Monster Chain Hack
Incident Overview
The contract owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens.
The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7ecc57f5…64d508
The contract deployer sold tokens at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb130a570…b1019d
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x960f8b8d…d9833c
The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x402e4c0c…307abd
The stolen ETH was transferred to the external wallet at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xbca7f22a…3e7dd2
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Monster Chain, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Honeypot are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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