How much was lost in the Tetris Finance hack?

The Tetris Finance hack resulted in $218K in losses on December 17, 2020.

What attack technique was used in the Tetris Finance exploit?

The Tetris Finance exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

Tetris Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $218K

Low Dec 17, 2020 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2020 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #1263 By amount stolen

Auditors 3 Prior security audits

Incident Overview

The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x932f162d…bd8a39

The contract deployer used hidden migration functionality under the rewardUpdate() to transfer all LP tokens from the reward distribution contracts onto the own wallet at:

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x26a4c416…14d497

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x0f1c4a13…896f21

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xd6dbb59f…db71fd

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x026d3649…108d22

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x18c3914e…9ed52e

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x7d54686b…5e5590

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x45e47c92…b3084d

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x8d176f37…07d106

The project's native tokens were sold as well, the example transaction:

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xd8dd42cb…f373f7

The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer. The received tokens were exchanged on BNB and were distributed between different external wallets at:

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x965d4dd7…bc81ef

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x5030fc70…97a26f

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x84d0f4ba…f29ae8

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x46b5fee4…db6943

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x671ce100…e12e91

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x6985c92b…1fda37

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x8dfbab27…c1a0bb

https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xbacda7bf…2f2d16

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Tetris Finance

Date of Incident December 17, 2020

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Yield Aggregator

Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Derivatives

Affected Token TTR

Official Website tetris.menu/

Protocol Twitter/X @TetrisMenu

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories

Optimism Ecosystem Base Ecosystem

Protocol Links

GitHub Discord

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Tetris Finance's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

Audited by Audit Report 1, Audit Report 2, Audit Report 3 — still lost $218K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Tetris Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (December 2020).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Audit Report 1 Report
Audit Report 2 Report
Audit Report 3 Report

Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://tetris.menu/

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

LOW

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Yield Aggregator
Year 2020

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