Impossible Finance Hack
Incident Overview
The attacker's address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x8e0d334a…72ef02
The transactions behind the attack:
https://explorer.bitquery.io/bsc/txs/calls?internal=false&contract=0xc7ca5478…aa11e6&method=641ccd83
The attacker:
- borrowed 233.3 BNB of flash loan from PancakeSwap
- swapped 65,140 IF tokens
- created a fake token called AAA (BBB)
https://bscscan.com/token/0x9892dd7a…8dac74
- created LP with the fake token and IF token
- swapped 32,570 IF into 221,898 BUSD and another 32,570 IF into 221,898 BUSD using IF router through the FAKE token LP
- repeated the steps from 3 to 5
- sold 556,384 BUSD for 1,731 BNB, repaid the flash loan.
Stolen funds were bridged into Ethereum mainnet onto this address:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x8e0d334a…72ef02
The further destination is unknown.
There are transactions where the Impossible Finance hacker is transferring BNB tokens, which were used to perform a flash loan into the Impossible Finance deployer's address at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x05d962a8…dcb244
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x487403ee…6edbb1
In addition:
- Impossible Finance exploiter into 0x6b3 (849.2 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x7104c2c1…235eff
- 0x6b3 into Eleven Finance deployer (849 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb70cb9da…6ee4f1
The further funds' flow as follows:
1. Deployer into Gnosis Safe Proxy:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x48ccb426…01e644
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x1384c22d…d245ec
2. Gnosis Safe Proxy into 0x22b (1,000 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfdb6fec8…a56c96
2.1 Gnosis Safe Proxy into 0x1Cc (521 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x63d7b8fd…412e80 (Still on the balance)
3. 0x22b into 0x736 (900 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xdb8860fc…bc4941
3.1 0x736 into Disperse (674.35 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf912b616…08c010
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xe705db37…b57776
3.2 0x736 added liquidity into pair WBNB / IF (225 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xedcd98a1…e98833
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3c8de03c…9b772c
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb9389fce…864f57
4. 0x22b into 0x1Cc (451 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc2484e4e…0fe5fd
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf984147f…7298c0
4.1 0x1Cc into Binance How wallet (450.99 BNB):
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf3cef212…a4ebc3
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Impossible Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (June 2021).
- Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Zokyo Report
Related Attack Classes
The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:
Sources & References
Learn to Prevent the Next Impossible Finance
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